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Wild birds are suspected to have played a role in highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreaks
in West Bengal. Cluster analysis showed that H5N1 was introduced in West Bengal at least 3 times
between 2008 and 2010.We simulated the introduction ofH5N1 bywild birds and their contact with poultry
through a stochastic continuous-time mathematical model. Results showed that reducing contact between
wild birds and domestic poultry, and increasing the culling rate of infected domestic poultry communities
will reduce the probability of outbreaks. Poultry communities that shared habitat with wild birds or those
indistricts with previous outbreaks were more likely to suffer an outbreak. These results indicate that
wild birds can introduce HPAI to domestic poultry and that limiting their contact at shared habitats
together with swift culling of infected domestic poultry can greatly reduce the likelihood ofHPAI outbreaks.
H
ighly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 (hereafter H5N1) first emerged in 1996 in Eastern Asia
and has been circulating amongst avian populations since then. Today, H5N1 has spread into parts of
Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The 2005 H5N1 outbreak in China’s Qinghai Lake migratory
birds resulted in more than 6000 bird mortalities1,2. Subsequent migratory wild bird mortalities were observed in
the same year inMongolia, Kazakhstan, western parts of China and Eastern Europe3,4. Migratory birds are known
to carry the infection5 which supports the hypothesis they may have played a role in the spread of H5N16.
However, some believe that it is unlikely for a bird to carry such highly pathogenic virus during the physiologically
taxing activity of migration7. In contrast, the spread of H5N1 along wild bird migratory routes may be explained
by recent studies suggesting that previous exposure of birds to low pathogenic avian influenza may provide
resistance to H5N18. Furthermore, it is also suggested that there might be instances where the virus is transmitted
in cycles of infections in bird flocks during migration9. A global study investigating sources of H5N1 infections in
poultry in 2006 indicated that 3 out of 21 outbreaks in Asia were introduced by migratory birds10.
India’s first H5N1 outbreak was reported in January of 2006 in the Navapur District, Maharashtra, India. Since
then H5N1 has been reported in 8 different states. In West Bengal, 54 H5N1 outbreaks in poultry were reported
between Jan 2006 and Aug 2010 making it the state with highest incidence in India11. Very few studies have been
conducted about the epidemiology of H5N1 outbreaks in India. Gilbert and others studied the epidemiological
risk factors associated with themigrations of sentinel species in the area ofWest Bengal and adjacent Bangladesh9.
Adhikari and others estimated the disease incidence using an ecological niche modeling tool12. Fewer large-scale
monitoring studies have been conducted to estimate the prevalence of H5N1 in wild birds in India13,14. HPAI
models created until now have considered a single introduction of virus from wild birds to poultry. Others
concerning wild birds have included a continuous transmission model in wild birds exclusively15. Few math-
ematical models included both wild birds as well as poultry with continuous contact with each other16,17. To date,
H5N1 outbreaks in India are restricted to poultry except for outbreaks in Jungle Crow (Corvus macrorhynhos)
that took place in February 201211. Models describing such outbreaks have focused on poultry dynamics18,19.
Hence, modeling H5N1 outbreaks with continuous contact between wild birds and poultry along with studies
focusing on risk factors related to wild birds in India are lacking.
Much work has been done to model bird migration and correlating the spatial and temporal migration pattern
with the spread of H5N1. Many studies illustrated migration as stopovers4,20,21. A modeling study about disease
OPEN
SUBJECT AREAS:
STATISTICAL METHODS
POPULATION DYNAMICS
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
INFLUENZA VIRUS
Received
22 January 2013
Accepted
24 June 2013
Published
12 July 2013
Correspondence and
requests for materials
should be addressed to
S.S.A. (saly@ucdavis.
edu)
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 2175 | DOI: 10.1038/srep02175 1
dynamics in bar-headed geeseAnser indicus indicated these wild bird
populations suffer greater mortality during the autumn versus spring
migration due to the higher number of outbreaks in the autumn22.
Bourouiba et al (2011) also studied the interaction between poultry
and migratory birds sustaining virus over long periods in China23.
However, H5N1 viruses, if present, are thought to generally be at very
low prevalence among migratory birds. Few samples have been col-
lected from live birds in the region of this study24, and except for
recent outbreaks in crows in India there are no reports of the virus in
wild birds from India11. Thus studies of less than 10,000 birds are not
likely to detect HPAI25. Larger studies estimate low prevalence (2.7%)
of H5 subtypes elsewhere in theWorld26. Although the H5N1 virus is
now endemic in the study region, it is speculated that the first intro-
ductions were because of migratory birds10. It is well documented
that viruses do circulate in wild bird populations and that the virus
populations grow at waterfowl wintering grounds. Thus it is reas-
onable to conclude in this study that first introductions of H5N1
were throughmigratory birds. The current study illustrates infection
dynamics of H5N1 virus in wintering grounds of West-Bengal
assuming that the first introduction of the virus is from a migratory
bird.
The focus of this research was to describe the epidemiology of
H5N1 outbreaks in West Bengal, India from 2008 to 2010. The first
objective was to describe the regional epidemiology of H5N1, spatio-
temporal clusters and transmissibility as estimated by the basic
reproductive number. Second, a stochastic mathematical model
was designed to investigate the role of wild bird congregations in
the regional epidemiology of H5N1 inWest Bengal, and a sensitivity
analysis was performed to identify potentially effective control mea-
sures for H5N1 transmission. The model specifically illustrates the
dynamics of the disease in poultry as well as wild bird congregations
(which is a mixture of resident and wintering migratory birds),
unlike previous models mentioned which simulate spread during
migration. Finally, risk factors relating to wild migratory bird con-
gregations and H5N1 outbreaks in poultry in West Bengal were
investigated.
Results
We conducted a series of analysis on the epidemiological data on
H5N1 outbreaks in poultry in West Bengal. Here we present results
for spatio-temporal cluster analysis, basic reproductive number
estimation, stochastic modeling for disease dynamics in wild birds
and poultry, and identify important risk factors related to wild birds
for H5N1 outbreaks in West Bengal.
Cluster analysis. One most likely spatial cluster of 95.92 km radius
(p ,0.01) and two secondary spatial clusters were identified.
Temporal cluster analysis showed that all the outbreaks under the
study in the time frame of 1st January 2008 to 1st December 2010
were clustered into a single temporal cluster. The spatio-temporal
cluster analysis also showed one most likely cluster and two
secondary clusters. Location and time frame of spatio-temporal
clusters are presented in Figure 1 and details of these clusters, time
frames and relative risks are presented in Table 1.
Basic Reproductive Number R0.Three R0 calculationmethods were
used and yielded very similar estimates. The formula for SI disease
models described by Ward et al27 estimated the mean of the
transmission parameter b at 0.127 (Supplementary Table S1) with
values that were exponentially distributed (m 50.122). The estimate
for R0, assuming a seven-day infectious period prior to culling, was
0.859 (60.326 S.D.). Doubling time of the outbreak was calculated to
be 10 days from observed data and hence R0 was calculated to be
1.069. The mean number of times an outbreak was source to a future
outbreak, based on the outbreak site being nearest neighbor in
previous seven days, was 0.969 (60.182 S.D.). The estimate for R0
based on the simulated outbreak was 1.034. Descriptive statistics for
the R0 estimates are presented in Table 2.
Stochastic Model. The mean time to maximum number of infected
villages in 1000 iterations showed an epidemic curve with a peak at
the 80th day of introduction of infection. On average 1.91% of villages
suffered an outbreak during the study period while 98.5% of villages
remained susceptible after the peak of the epidemic. Descriptive
statistics of susceptible, infected and culled villages and peak time
are presented in Table 3.
Sensitivity analysis for the model inputs showed that besides the
transmission parameters for wild birds and poultry, the proportion
of wild birds sharing the habitat with poultry (V) and culling rate
(Cu) had the next greatest influence on H5N1 transmission. For b,
the Spearman Rank correlation coefficient estimate with R0 was 0.90
and for number of villages infected at peak was 0.93. Reducing the b
to half resulted in an increase in the probability of no outbreak from
0.93 to 0.99 and reduced the estimate for R0 from 1.034 to 1.00.When
V was reduced systematically from 0.5 to 0.1 in decrements of 0.1, R0
decreased from 1.034 to 1.027 while the probability of no outbreak
increased from 0.93 to 0.95. In addition, the number of villages
infected at the end of the epidemic was reduced from 172 to 113 as
V was changed from 0.5 to 0.1. When Cu was reduced from 7 to 3
days R0 changed from 1.0283 to 1.000, while the probability of no
outbreak increased from 0.94 to 0.98. Combination of Cu5 0.3 and
V50.2 resulted in a substantial increase in the probability of no
outbreak to 0.99 and a reduction in R0 to 1.002. Spearman correlation
coefficients are depicted in Figure 2.
Logistic regressionmodel.Domestic ducks sharing the same habitat
with wild birds and previous history of outbreak in the same district
were the only two significant predictors for an H5N1 outbreak in
poultry (Table 4). Previous history of outbreaks in the same district
increased the odds of suffering outbreaks by 4.07 (95% confidence
interval; 1.34–12.4). Model results were adjusted for the distance
from a village’s wild bird community which was found to be a con-
founder of the association between shared habitat and occurrence of
an H5N1 outbreak.
Discussion
The current study is the first epidemiological investigation of H5N1
outbreaks in West Bengal to apply spatial, statistical and mathemat-
ical modeling tools to investigate the role of wild birds in the spread
of the disease in poultry. This is the first study to estimate R0 for
outbreaks in West Bengal. In addition, this is the first study to com-
pare wild bird related risk factors. Stochastic model results and con-
clusions from the risk factor analysis, both indicate that domestic
poultry, especially domestic ducks, sharing habitat with wild bird
congregations is an important risk factor in predicting H5N1 out-
breaks in poultry. Mathematical modeling of H5N1 transmission
showed that reducing contact between poultry (b) remains the most
important factor for controlling the spread of the disease. Sensitivity
analysis of the stochasticmodel indicated that themixing of domestic
birds and wild birds was the most influential wild bird related vari-
able influencing the probability of occurrence of an outbreak. The
two most influential factors were poultry related. Previous models of
avian influenza related to wild birds reported on the dynamics of the
infection in the wild birds duringmigration, specifically from ‘breed-
ing ground’ to ‘wintering ground’ and back to ‘breeding ground’28,22.
The current study focused on wintering grounds migration flux that
occurs in the Indian subcontinent during the winter months from
November to February. The virus is known to be carried over long
distances from the northern breeding grounds circulating in the wild
bird population (amix of local resident wild birds andmigratory wild
birds) and poultry. Galworthy et al described a slight delay in the
migration because of the persistent infection28. Pre-immunization of
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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wild birds with low pathogenic avian influenza is known to reduce
the intensity of HPAI infection29, and is modeled in detail by
Bourouiba et al23. Even though there are observations of low patho-
genic viruses inwild birds in India14,24 ourmodel does not account for
changes due to prior possible LPAI infection.
Risk factors analyzed in the study indicated that locations with
constant interaction between wild birds and poultry may play an
important role in transmission of HPAI from wild birds to poultry.
Small ponds in every village specifically built for fishing by locals are
generally considered the main sites where wild birds and domestic
ducks co-mingle. Rice-duck-human interactions are speculated to
create ideal conditions to sustain HPAI, especially in the state of
West Bengal30. A study conducted in Thailand also confirmed the
role of domestic waterfowl in sustaining HPAI31.
Outbreaks of H5N1 in the West Bengal India between 2008 and
2010 were not randomly distributed in time and space. Spatio-
temporal differences in outbreaks indicated that the H5N1 virus
was introduced at least three times in the susceptible populations
between 2008 and 2010. Phylogenetic studies done on virus isolates
from these outbreaks also indicate that there have been multiple
Figure 1 | Spatio-temporal clusters of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 outbreaks in poultry inWest Bengal, India during the period between
2008 to 2010 (Map used by permission. Copyright E Esri. All rights reserved).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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sources of the virus in the country during the early phase I out-
breaks32. This study may be limited by possible under reporting of
outbreaks due to the lack of formal reporting systems in remote
villages, or underreporting by backyard poultry farmers because of
fear of possible economic loss and restriction on poultry business.
This explains the difference in observed and predicted number of
infected villages. Underreporting may also explain the low R0 esti-
mated in this study. However, reporting of backyard poultry deaths
may have changed because of the compensation offered by govern-
ment for submitting ailing birds for culling33. Government author-
ities responded to each outbreak by implementing depopulation,
disinfection and serological surveillance of sentinel poultry birds.
These interventions might have influenced distribution of the dis-
ease. Understanding the impact of these interventions is very difficult
as the outcome in absence of these interventions is never observed34.
Estimates of R0 with nearest neighbor method, SI method and
epidemic doubling time ranged from 0.859 to 1.069. The R0 estimates
may inform decisionmakers whose responsibility is to devise control
strategies. The variation of the R0 from 0.859 to 1.069 indicates there
might be multiple primary sources for the outbreak and this should
be further investigated35. R0 estimated using the SI model was con-
siderably lower than 1 (0.859 6 0.328 S.D.). However, the outbreak
did take place. This phenomenon may be explained by under report-
ing of infected villages as indicated in table S1 by several weeks of zero
infected villages after the start of the epidemic (Table: S1) which in
turn biased the mean value of R0 to below 1.
The estimates of R0 from the three methods used in this study vary
considerably frompreviously reported estimates. Liu et al16 estimated
R0 to be 3.3 while Bouma et al36 estimated it at 1.6 usingmathematical
models. While the H5N1 outbreak in Romania in 2006 had an esti-
mated R0 ranging from 1.95 to 2.68 based on 161 infected villages27.
The current study is based on only 33 outbreaks in West Bengal.
It is essential to estimate the R0 using different methods, because
R0 depends on contact patterns between susceptible and infectious
individuals or populations27. The methods used in estimation of R0
assume that a population of village poultry was infectious for 7 days.
Other studies estimate the incubation period of the disease to be 2–6
days or sometimes 1–4 days37,38. However, studies which consider the
village as its epidemiological unit consider 7 days as infectious period
because accurate estimates of the period of infectiousness are
unavailable27. A similar assumption was made where nearest infec-
tious neighbor population was considered to be source of the new
outbreak. While the real mechanism of virus spread might be due to
movement of poultry or wild birds, through live markets, or fomites,
Table 2 | Descriptive statistics for the basic reproductive number (R0) for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 outbreaks in poultry in
West Bengal, India during the period between 2008 to 2010 as estimated by 4 different methods
Method of calculating R0 R0 Mean Standard deviation R0 Median Minimum Maximum
Nearest neighbor* 0.970 0.182 1 0 4
SI model** 0.859 0.328 0 0 7.000
Doubling time*** 1.069 - - - -
Stochastic mathematical model 1.034 - - - -
*Nearest neighbor method of calculating R0 where nearest infectious village was considered as a source of a new outbreak.
**In Susceptible Infected (SI) model method b (Transmission factor) was estimated and R0 was estimated using bT, where T is length of infectious period.
***Epidemic doubling time was estimated from the observed outbreak and R0 was calculated using R051 1 (ln(2)/fD)*D, where fD is the time for epidemic to double and D is mean incubation period.
Table 1 | Observed spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal clusters of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 outbreaks in poultry inWest
Bengal, India during the period 2008 to 2010
Spatial Clusters
Mean
Nearest town (District) Latitude Longitude
No. of
Locations Radius (km)
Relative
Risk P value
Most likely Bolpur-Santiniketan (Birbhum) 23.64825 87.70186 13 95.92 6.53 ,0.001
Secondary (1) Bhagwangola(Murshidabad) 24.319 88.377 1 0 10.86 ,0.001
Secondary (2) Dinhata(Cooch Behar) 26.14 89.4562 1 0 4.01 ,0.001
Temporal Clusters
Mean
Nearest town (District) Latitude Longitude
No. of
Locations Time Frame
Relative
Risk P value
Most likely Kandi (Murshidabad) 23.917347 88.026247 33 2008/1/1 to 2010/12/1 17.18 0.001
Spatio-Temporal Clusters
Mean
Nearest town (District) Latitude Longitude
No. of
Locations Time Frame (Radius km)
Relative
Risk P value
Most likely Labpur(Birbhum) 23.8018 87.7133 1 2008/1/17 to 2008/1/17 (0) 104.29 ,0.001
Secondary (1) Bhagwangola(Murshidabad) 24.319 88.377 1 2008/4/1 to 2008/4/1 (0) 38.83 ,0.001
Secondary (2) Kuchut (Bardhaman) 23.26625 88.043465 10 2008/1/15 to 2008/1/15
(62.7)
13.29 ,0.001
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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the closest infectious village to each outbreak was assumed to be the
source of infection39–41. Control strategies can be aimed at reducing
R0 to less than one and hence reduce the critical coverage proportion
of vaccination to achieve herd immunity in future prevention efforts.
Modeling results are useful in understanding the size of an HPAI
outbreak which helps decision-makers to formulate control mea-
sures to avoid or control future outbreaks, something that was lack-
ing after the 2008–2010 outbreaks33. The International Office of
Epizootics states that places with large wetlands and high density
of poultry in contact with wild birds can be a very important risk
factor and prevention measures can be concentrated in such
regions42. Preventionmeasures include reducing the contact between
wild birds and domestic ducks by not allowing the domestic birds to
forage freely near wetlands. Educational programs, targeting back-
yard flock owners should recommend reducing the contact between
poultry and wild birds, reporting suspect cases and expedited culling
to reduce the risk of HPAI transmission.
Wild birds carry avian influenza viruses from their breeding to
wintering grounds. This study indicated that contact between wild
birds and poultry is one risk factor for outbreaks. The state of West
Bengal is a major rice producing state, producing two crops per year
unlike other states that produce a single crop per year. In addition,
West Bengal has large numbers of domestic ducks that interact with
wild birds and poultry. These ducks generally graze and swim in the
same habitat wheremigratory ducks and other wild birds congregate.
HPAI virus can be easily transmitted at such places via fecal oral
route. Control of the virus spread should be concentrated in water-
bodies shared between wild birds and domestic ducks and poultry.
Surveillance can be targeted on such water-bodies where wild birds
and domestic ducks share habitat. Organized poultry farms need to
increase their biosecurity to prevent outbreaks, including keeping
domestic ducks separate from other poultry and reducing contact
between their poultry flocks and wild birds.
Methods
Data collection. The National Institute of Virology and the Ela Foundation of
India collected migratory bird data as part of an avian influenza surveillance project
in 2010. The data included observations of known wintering grounds along with
incidentally found congregations on large natural water-bodies, flooded rice fields,
and reservoirs. Data available regarding avian influenza risk factors for these
congregations included avian community size, habitat, sentinel species, species
previously known positive for H5N1, bridge species, and occurrence of domestic
ducks in the same water-body43–45. Observations were done using standard ‘‘point
count’’ techniques by authors (SP and PP)46. Previous observations and ornithological
records suggest that the observed risk factors at these wintering water-bodies remain
constant from onemigratory season to the next47,48.We used data on outbreaks which
occurred during the years 2008 to 2010 inWest Bengal (available from theOIEWorld
Animal Health information Database (WAHID). The data included reported bird
mortalities, outbreak cases, and susceptible birds during the outbreaks.
Cluster analysis. Spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal cluster analyses were
performed using SatScan. Clusters were calculated based on number of cases
occurring in an outbreak and susceptible population using a discrete Poisson model49
(equation 1).
SW~maximum W[Wð ÞX Wð Þ, ð1Þ
Where X is number of events and W is the size of the window scan. Subsequently,
clusters weremapped inArcMap (ArcGIS 10.0 ESRI Inc., RedlandCA) along with the
spatial means of the clusters (World Topographic Map, ArcGIS 10.0 ESRI Inc.,
Redland CA.; 1970 Datum, Stereographic 70 Projection).
Estimation of basic reproductive number. The basic reproductive number (R0) is
the mean number of secondary cases caused by an infectious individual during its
entire infectious period when introduced to a fully susceptible population50. The
epidemiological unit of interest in this study is the village; hence the basic
reproductive number was defined as the expected number of secondary outbreaks
arising from a single individual village outbreak during the entire follow up period. R0
was calculated by SImodeling method, nearest infectious neighbormethod, epidemic
doubling time method. Details of the methods used are described in similar previous
studies27.
Stochastic mathematical model.Wild migratory birds are asymptomatic carriers of
the virus and may infect local wild birds or poultry at their wintering grounds.
Different hypotheses have been put forth, explaining the mechanism of wild
migratory birds carrying the virus over long distances4,9,51. In contrast to previous
models which considered wild birds to be a one-time infectious source which is
specified as a single signal in themodel, the current study assumed that wild birds can
continuously interact and have contact with poultry at a specific rate. Hence, wild
birds could be a continuous source of infection to other wild birds and poultry. We
constructed a stochastic continuous-time mathematical model based on frequency
dependent transmission, which assumed that the number of adequate contacts was
independent of number of poultry or wild bird congregations (Figure 3). Frequency
dependent transmission was justified by that a village was considered infected if
exposed to adequate contact for transmission of HPAI from a single or several
infected wild birds. The domestic-wild bird transmission model design was a
Figure 2 | Correlation between model inputs and number of infected villages at the peak of the outbreak predicted by a continuous-time stochastic
SIC-SIRS mathematical model for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 transmission in wild birds and poultry in West Bengal, India. B5
Transmission Factor in poultry; Cu5 Culling rate in poultry (per day); Iw5 Number of Initial wild bird congregations infected with H5N1; V5
Proportion of wild birds sharing habitat and having some kind of direct contact with poultry communities; ww5 Rate of waning immunity in wild birds
after recovery from H5N1 (per day); Bw5 Transmission factor in wild birds; rw5 Recovery rate in wild birds upon infection with H5N1 (per day).
Table 3 | Descriptive Statistics for the number of villages with sus-
ceptible, infected and culled poultry flocks, and time at peak of
outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 predicted
by a continuous-time stochastic mathematical model
Villages Mean (%)
Standard
deviation Median (%) Mode (%)
Susceptible 37378 (98.5) 4335 37945 (100) 1 (0.002)
Infected 266 (0.70) 2007 0 (0) 1 (0.002)
Culled 461 (1.21) 3760 0 (0) 1 (0.002)
Peak time
(days)
23 18 11 51
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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SIC-SIRS model for the change in disease status of a poultry flock in a village from
susceptible (S), infected (I) and culled (C) and wild birds in a wild bird congregation
from S, I, recovered (R) and S again.
Each village was considered to have both poultry and wild bird groups susceptible
toHPAI infection. Once a flock was infected in a village, it was assumed that the entire
village was infected andwill be culled.Model assumptions included no decrease in the
population of wild birds as evidence suggests the mortality due to HPAI is likely to be
minimal9,52–54. The proportion of poultry communities having possible connection by
sharing the same water-body or via bridge avian species (syn-anthropic wild bird
species) among the wild bird congregations were estimated as a stochastic parameter
(V) due to inherent variability in its value. The transmission rate between an infected
poultry community to a susceptible one (b) was derived from the R0 estimated using
SI method based on the field data. In contrast, the transmission rate between wild
birds and fromwild birds to poultry communities (bW)was based on a previous study
of avian influenza dynamics in wild birds17. The following are the ordinary differential
equations used for the continuous time-stochastic mathematical model for trans-
mission of HPAI in wild birds and poultry in West Bengal India:
dSD
dt
~{bSDID{VbWIWSD
dID
dt
~bSDID{CuIDzVbWIWSD
dCD
dt
~CuID
dSW
dt
~{bWSWIW{VbWIDSWzwWRW
dIW
dt
~bWSWIWzVbWIDSW{rWIW
dRW
dt
~rWIW{wWRW ,
where:
. SD 5 Proportion of susceptible villages with domestic poultry
. ID 5 Proportion of infected villages with domestic poultry
. CD 5 Proportion of villages with culled poultry
. Sw 5 Proportion of susceptible wild bird congregations
. Iw 5 Proportion of infected wild bird congregations
. Rw5 Proportion of recovered wild birds
. b 5 Transmission factor for transmission of H5N1 between domestic poultry
communities
. bw 5 Transmission factor for transmission of H5N1 from wild birds to domestic
poultry communities, and between wild birds
. V 5 Proportion of wild birds in all forms of sufficient contact with domestic poultry
. Cu 5 Culling rate of infected domestic poultry
. rw 5 recovery rate of infected wild birds
. wW 5 Rate at which natural immunity wanes in wild birds
Estimation of stochastic model parameters. The model assumed all the villages
(n537,945) in the state of West Bengal to be susceptible poultry communities along
with an estimated equal number of wild bird congregations55. The outbreak started
with the introduction of a single infected community of wild birds, hence IW (t51)
was estimated at 1/37,945, while ID (t51) was zero. The b estimate based on the SI
model of observed data was found to be exponential distributed (m 5 0.122691). The
bW was estimated at 1.00E-0817. Infected poultry were either completely culled or
dead within 7 days of the infection and hence a fixed cull rate of 1/7 was assumed for
the entire study period. Waning immunity in infected wild birds was estimated to be
0.038/day based on a previous study17. During the survey of wild birds inWest Bengal
it was observed that almost half of the wild bird congregations have contact with
poultry by sharing the same habitat or by presence of bridge species. Hence V, an
estimate of the adequate contact between wild birds and poultry was determined to be
0.5 and introduced into the model as a stochastic parameter that is normally
distributed (SD50.1). Recovery rate of infected wild birds (rw) was considered to be
17 days54. The R0 was estimated using the total infected villages at the end of the
outbreak56.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to investigate the effect of different model
inputs on number of infected villages and rank inputs by importance. The Spearman
Figure 3 | Highly Pathogenic Avian InfluenzaH5N1DiseaseDynamics: Infection in poultry communities is described by a SICmodel, and inwild bird
communities is by a SIRS model. Interactions between poultry and wild birds are depicted as dotted lines. HPAI transmission is governed by the
probabilities depicted at every transmission.
Table 4 | Results of a logistic regression model for the association between risk factors and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1
outbreaks in poultry in West Bengal, India during the period between 2008 to 2010
95% confidence limits
Variable Odds Ratio Standard error P value Lower Upper
Intercept 0.37 0.61 0.11 0.11 1.22
Sharing habitat with wild birds 5.14 0.57 0.01 1.68 15.76
History of outbreak in district 3.49 0.58 0.03 1.12 10.87
Euclidian distance of outbreak from nearest
observed wildlife congregation (km)
0.99 0.01 0.16 0.98 1.01
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Rank correlation coefficient was used to estimate the correlation between each of the
model’s stochastic inputs and the number of infected villages at the peak of the
outbreak. The probability of no outbreak (total infected villages, than 1), R0 and the
number of villages infected at the peak of the outbreak were recorded to investigate
the effect of varying the model inputs on these outcomes.
Risk factor analysis. Risk factors influencing the incidence of HPAI are well known44
hence the current study focused on risk factors related to wild birds which might
affect the incidence of disease in poultry. Specifically, sightings of birds of Orders
Galliformes and Charadriiformes which are considered sentinel species and syn-
anthropic wild birds which serve as bridge species44 in the vicinity of poultry HPAI
outbreaks were investigated. Remaining risk factors studied related to the critical
community size (CCS) which is defined as the number of individuals able tomaintain
infection in an environment for certain period of time. The CCS for HPAI was
estimated to be 1200–1500 birds which considering the habitat in which wild birds are
found, largewater-bodiesmay play a very important role inmaintaining the infection.
For example, presence or proximity to rice fields is known to be an important risk
factor30. Other factors investigated are shared habitats between domestic ducks
allowed to graze in water bodies with migratory birds, a common practice in places in
West Bengal. Hence for the risk factor analysis CCS, habitat of the observed
congregation57, presence of previously known HPAI infected species58, sentinel
species and bridge species in the avian community of the congregation and presence
of domestic ducks in the same habitat59 were considered.
Fifty-four random points were generated in the map of West Bengal as controls.
Nearest observed wild bird community was used as predictors for both outbreaks and
controls. Logistic regression was used to study the association between the various
putative risk factors (mentioned before in the paragraph above) and the presence of
HPAI infection. The associationwas estimated as the ratio of the odds of exposure to a
risk factor in a village with H5N1 infected poultry to the odds of exposure to that risk
factor in an uninfected village. A forward manual step-wise model building algorithm
was implemented with a two-sided P value#0.10 for the inclusion of a risk factor in
themodel was used. Competingmodels were compared using the likelihood ratio test.
The final model’s goodness of fit was assessed using the deviance with a chi square
test. Confounding of the association between sharing of habitat by poultry and wild
birds and presence of a H5N1 outbreak in poultry by each of the risk factors was
assessed using the method of change in estimates. The model was adjusted for a
confounder if inclusion of the variable changed the estimated ORs by more than
10%60.
The logistic regression model was a generalized linear model with a logit link. The
model predicted the log odds of the probability of an H5N1 outbreak in the ith
domestic flock as predicted by putative risk factors and was formulated as below:
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bDistance to nearest observedwildlif eXi,Distance to nearest observedwildlif e:
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